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Abstract—Hybrid systems are discrete controllers that are used for controlling a physical process (plant) exhibiting continuous
dynamics. A hybrid automata (HA) is a well known and widely used formal model for the specification of such systems. While many
methods exist for simulating hybrid automata, there are no known approaches for the automatic code generation from HA that are
semantic preserving. If this were feasible, it would enable the design of a plant-on-a-chip (PoC) system that could be used for the
emulation of the plant to validate discrete controllers. Such an approach would need to be mathematically sound and should not rely on
numerical solvers. We propose a method of PoC design for plant emulation, not possible before. The approach restricts input/output
(I/O) HA models using a set of criteria for well-formedness which are statically verified. Following verification, we use an abstraction
based on a synchronous approach to facilitate code generation. This is feasible through a sound transformation to synchronous HA.
We compare our method (the developed tool called Piha) to the widely used Simulink R© simulation framework and show that our
method is superior in both execution time and code size. Our approach to the PoC problem paves the way for the emulation of physical
plants in diverse domains such as robotics, automation, medical devices, and intelligent transportation systems.
Index Terms—Hybrid Automata, Synchronous Languages, Plant-on-a-Chip (PoC), Code Generation.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical Systems (CPS) [1], [2] encompass a wide
range of systems where distributed embedded controllers
are used for controlling physical processes. Examples range
from the controller of a robotic arm, controllers in automo-
tive such as drive-by-wire applications to pacemakers for
a heart. Such systems, also called hybrid systems, combine
a set of discrete controllers with associated physical plants
that exhibit continuous dynamics. An individual plant com-
bined with its controller is often formally described us-
ing Hybrid Automata (HA) [3], [2], [4]. These HA use a
combination of discrete locations or modes and Ordinary
Differential Equations (ODEs) to capture the continuous
dynamics of an individual mode.
CPS pose many key challenges for their design, espe-
cially since they are inherently safety-critical. CPS must op-
erate in a sound manner while preserving key requirements
for both functional and timing correctness [5]. Moreover,
there is a need for most CPS to be certified using functional
safety standards such as IEC 61580 [6] (robotics and automa-
tion), ISO 26262 [7] (automotive), DO-178B [8] (flight con-
trol), US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) [9] (medical
devices). Certification is a key barrier to rapid adoption of
new technology as compliance costs are prohibitive. Also, in
spite of products being certified, faults can occur and associ-
ated recalls are required, which can be immensely costly in
terms of human lives and economics. For example, close to
200,000 pacemakers were recalled between 1990–2000 due
to software related failures and this trend is continuing [10].
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In spite of these safety crtical needs, current design
practices often use tools without rigorous semantics. For
example, simulation tools such as Matlab R© Simulink R© and
Stateflow R© [11], [12] are arguably the default standard in
many fields, including automotive and medical. These tools
enable the encoding of an HA using a set of Simulink R©
blocks to specify the continuous dynamics while the dis-
crete aspects are modelled using Stateflow R©. Due to the
lack of rigorous semantics in Simulink R©/Stateflow R©, many
problems have been reported in literature regarding the
lack of good model fidelity. To overcome these problems,
tools with rigorous semantics such as Ptolemy [13] and
Ze´lus [12], [14] have been developed. These tools have de-
veloped mathematical semantics for the composition of the
blocks and hence do not have semantic problems. However,
all available tools, we are aware of, use numerical solvers
during simulation to solve the ODEs. This poses two key
challenges in the design of the CPS. Firstly, the simulation
is inherently slow and potentially unsuitable for validating
controllers in closed loop that can be critical to certification.
A second problem is that simulation fidelity is dependent
on the nature of the ODE solver and changing the solver
may result in a different outcome.
Hardware-in-the loop simulation, also known as emula-
tion [15], uses the actual plant in conjunction with the con-
troller for validation. Emulation has been shown in many
domains (such as motor controllers) to be an extremely
effective method of validation. However, emulation of a
hybrid system may not be feasible due to the following
reasons. (1) The physical process may also be part of the
design and not available for testing, e.g. a robotic arm
and its controller are required but the actual robot may
not exist yet. This is an even more significant hurdle for
medical devices such as pacemakers, where emulating the
actual system is often not feasible or may require animal
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experiments that are challenging in terms of ethics, time
and cost. (2) Simulation of physical process using existing
tools may not be able to meet the timing requirements of
emulation, e.g. real time responses.
Our work overcomes these barriers by proposing, for the
first time, the concept of plant-on-a-chip (PoC). A PoC is an
implementation of a hybrid system in C (and subsequently
VHDL), so that a physical process can be emulated using
a processor, ASIC, or FPGA. This device can then be used
for closed-loop validation of controllers in wide ranging ap-
plications in CPS such as robotics, automotive, and medical
devices.
Specification
(step 1)
Well-formed
hybrid automata
verification
(step 2)
Modular
compilation
(step 3)
Linking
parallel
composition
(step 4)
C code and
math library
(step 5)
Deployment
on the
embedded device
(step 6)
Pass
Fail–review the specification
Fig. 1. An overview of the proposed methodology
The proposed approach significantly extends the syn-
chronous approach [16] that is the default standard for
designing safety critical systems in many domains includ-
ing civil aviation. Consequently, our code generation relies
on the well known tenets of the synchronous approach.
An overview of the proposed methodology is presented
in Figure 1. We start with a specification that describes a
network of HA models of a CPS (step 1). To facilitate code
generation, we constrain such models using a set of well
formedness criteria, which can be statically verified (step
2). We then introduce an abstraction called synchronous
hybrid automata (SHA), that provides the semantics of the
generated code, and using this abstraction separate compi-
lation can be performed for each HA (step 3). Such modular
compilation is feasible due to the synchronous semantics
of a network of well formed HAs (WHAs) presented in
Section 3.4. Using this semantics, we perform a linking
operation of the generated C code (step 4). Finally, the
generated C code (step 5) can be compiled using a standard
C compiler to deploy the binary on an embedded target
platform (step 6). The proposed methodology is detailed in
Section 4.
1.1 Related work
The design of CPS requires both formal analysis [17] and
testing-based validation. Of particular importance is the
need for emulation-based validation [15], as outlined above.
Hybrid automata and their compositions [3], [4] provide a
formal framework for the specification of hybrid systems.
There are well known negative results on the decidability of
the reachability problem over hybrid automata, i.e., even
the simplest class, called linear hybrid automata, is unde-
cidable [3]. Several restrictions have been proposed with
associated semi-decidable results that are used for devel-
oping model checking-based solutions [18]. However, the
negative decidability results mean that both formal analysis
and modular code generation are critical [12].
Unlike the objective of modular code generation based
on formal models, conventional CPS design relies on com-
mercial tools such as Simulink R© or Stateflow R© [11]. How-
ever, Simulink R© and Stateflow R© lack formal semantics for
the composition of the components leading to issues with
simulation fidelity (see [12], [19] for details). In contrast to
commercial tools, academic variants such as Ptolemy [13]
and Ze´lus [12] are founded on formal models of compu-
tation. Ptolemy supports multiple models of computations
and a specification can seamlessly combine them. This ap-
proach is extremely powerful for the simulation of complex
CPS. These tools can model hybrid systems that use numer-
ical solvers.
Sequential code generation from synchronous specifica-
tions is a very well developed area [16], [20]. For exam-
ple, the code generator from SCADE specifications [21],
[22] generates certified code according to the DO-178B
standard. However, existing synchronous code generators
are designed for discrete systems only and unsuitable for
generating code from HA descriptions. Ze´lus [12], on the
other hand, is an extension of the synchronous language
Lustre [16] with ODEs for the design of hybrid systems.
Ze´lus [12] overcomes the semantic ambiguities associated
with Simulink R©. While Ptolemy [13] and Ze´lus [12] are
significant developments for CPS design due to their sound
semantics, they are limited by their reliance on dynamic
ODE solvers during simulation. Consequently, they are un-
suitable for the emulation of physical processes. However,
we note that approaches such as Ptolemy [13] and Ze´lus [12]
are highly expressive as they can simulate any HA, while
the proposed approach generates code from Well-formed
Hybrid Automata (WHA) models, which are a subset of HA.
Code generation without using dynamic invocation of
numerical solvers have been attempted in the past with lim-
ited success. Alur et al. generated code from statechart-like
hierarchical HA models [23]. Like our approach, the authors
proposed a requirement of restricting HA execution to what
was statically verifiable. They enforced the requirement that
“a given mode and the corresponding guard of any switch
must overlap for a duration that is greater than the sampling
period” [23]. However, we show that code generation is
feasible without the need for such a restrictive approach.
In a similar vein, Kim et al. also presented an approach for
modular code generation from HA [24]. Their key idea was
also based on the discretization of HA, requiring that “tran-
sitions are taken at time multiples of the discretization step.”
Also, a SystemC based code generation for HA has been
proposed [25]. While the title claims code generation for HA,
the actual algorithms are restricted to timed automata [26]
and hence unsuitable for the general class of HA. This is
not adequate for modelling the physical plant properties in
many examples. In contrast, our approach (the developed
tool called Piha1) generates code using a technique that
1. Piha is the name of a well known New Zealand surfing paradise.
Piha (Pi-Hybrid Automata) also refers to synchronous HA and is not
related to the concept of pi in pi-calculus.
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is similar in principle, but without these overly restrictive
requirements. Hence, we demonstrate that many practical
CPS, ranging from pacemakers to boiler systems, can be
designed and implemented using the proposed approach.
1.2 Contributions and organisation
The key contributions of the paper are:
• A software engineering (SE) approach for designing CPS:
We propose an approach that is based on key SE prin-
ciples founded on formal methods and model-driven
engineering [27]. The overall system design starts with
the description of the system as a network of hybrid
automata. We propose a new semantics of HA based
on the notion of Well-formed Hybrid Automata (WHA).
The WHA requirements can be statically checked and
those that satisfy the WHA requirements are amenable
to code generation.
• Code generation without dynamic numerical solving: We
use a synchronous approach for the design of hybrid
systems [12], [14]. Unlike these code generators, which
rely on dynamic ODE solvers rendering them less suit-
able for PoC design, we generate code that uses no
numerical solver at run-time. This is achieved by an
algorithm that checks WHA requirements at compile
time to create closed form solutions of ODEs using
symbolic solvers. WHA based code generation is less
restrictive compared with existing code generators for
HA [23], [24] that also avoid dynamic ODE solvers.
• Semantic preserving modular compilation of HA: The pro-
posed approach is based on a compositional semantics
such that code can be generated for each HA separately.
• A new PoC design approach: We propose the first com-
prehensive approach for PoC design enabling the emu-
lation of many CPS applications. Our approach, thus,
paves the way for the reduction of the certification
effort for safety-critical devices such as pacemakers [28],
automotive electronics, and many other applications
where certification is a requirement.
• Practicality: We have applied our approach to the design
of several hybrid systems and compared our implemen-
tation with the widely used Simulink R© and Stateflow R©.
• Software tool: We have implemented these concepts in a
software tool called Piha.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we in-
troduce HA as a modelling framework for CPS. We also
define WHA as a restrictive class that is amenable for
code generation. In section 3 we introduce an abstraction
of WHA called synchronous hybrid automata and present
its semantics. In section 4 we present algorithms for code
generation based on the developed synchronous semantics.
The algorithms include those to determine if an HA meets
the requirements for code generation based on WHA. It also
includes the back-end code generators from HA definitions
to C using the developed synchronous semantics. Section 5
compares the proposed approach with existing tools such
as Simulink R© and Stateflow R©. Finally in section 6 we make
concluding remarks including the limitations of the devel-
oped approach and future research avenues.
2 BACKGROUND: HYBRID AUTOMATA
We use hybrid IO automata of Lynch et al. [29] to capture
the behaviour of the hybrid system similar to the models
adopted by Chen et al. [28]. This approach is specifically
amenable to the modelling of both the plant and its adjoin-
ing controller, and hence ideal for the PoC design approach
presented here. We refer to them as Hybrid Automata (HA)
for convenience.
To illustrate the concept of HA, consider a water tank
heating system, presented in Figure 2 (adapted from [3]),
where the temperature of the water inside the tank is to
be maintained between 20 and 100◦C. The temperature is
controlled by a digital controller that switches the heating
system ON and OFF at specific times so as to maintain the
temperature within the required range. The temperature of
water inside a tank is modelled using Newton’s law of
heating and cooling, which can be represented as x(t) =
Ie−Kt + h(1 − e−Kt). Here, I is the initial temperature, K
is a constant that depends on the thermal conductivity of
the tank, and h is a constant that depends on the power
output of the heating system, such as a gas burner. An
example trace of the temperature of water inside the tank
for an initial temperature of 20◦C is shown in Figure 2(b).
The initial temperature is 20◦C and the heating system is
turned ON. Next, the temperature of water increases until
it boils at 100◦C, when the time instant is 13.2 seconds.
Next, the temperature remains at 100◦C until 17.8 seconds,
when the heating system is turned OFF by the controller.
The temperature of water drops until 24.6 seconds, when
the controller switches ON the heating system again. We
describe the water tank as a hybrid automata in Figure 2(c)
and that of the gas burner in Figure 2(d).
The specification of the water tank heating system using
an HA is shown in Figure 2(c). An HA captures the interac-
tion between the plant (exhibiting continuous dynamics) and
a controller (making discrete mode switches). The continuous
evolution of some real-valued variables is modelled using
a set of Ordinary Differential Equations (ODEs), which
specify the rate of change of these variables. The controller
effects the discrete mode switches and in each mode the
plant exhibits different dynamics. As a consequence, the
ODEs in the different modes (also called locations) may be
different. For the water tank heating system, the HA can be
in any one of four different locations t1, t2, t3, and t4, where
t1 is the initial location. The variable x is used to model
the temperature of the water inside the tank. Each location
has some flow predicates that specify the rate of change
of the continuous variables. For example, in location t2 the
flow predicate that defines the rate of change of temperature
when the heater is turned ON is specified as x˙ = K(h − x).
Invariants are associated with locations, e.g. 20 ≤ x ≤ 100 is
an invariant associated with location t2. Execution remains
in a location until the invariant holds or an egress transition
triggers prior to this. Some locations may have initialization
conditions that provide the initial values of the variables
i.e. location t1. A transition out of a locations is enabled
when the input (event) is present and the jump condition
associated with the transition holds. When a given transition
is taken, the final value of the variables are updated. For
example, the transition from t2 to t3 is enabled when the
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(b) A trace generated from our tool, called Piha
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(c) Hybrid automata of the water tank
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(d) Hybrid automata of the gas burner. The reaction time of the gas burner is
1
10
seconds.
Fig. 2. An example of a water tank heating system – adapted from [3]. Figure 2(a) presents the plant and the discrete controller. Figures 2(c) and
2(d) captures the behaviour of the water tank and the gas burner. Figure 2(b) presents an example trace through a water tank heating system
(generated from our tool). The trace is a set of discrete points sampled every 0.2 seconds.
value of temperature is 100◦C and as the transition is taken,
the final value of x is updated using the equation x′ = x,
where x′ is an update variable. The values of the update
variables are used as the initial values of the variables in the
destination location.
An HA [29] is defined using Definition 1. For the water
tank example shown in Figure 2(c), Loc = {t1, t2, t3, t4},
Σ = {ON,OFF, τ}, and an example edge in Edge is
(t1, ON, t2). There is a single continuous variable x repre-
senting the temperature of the water in the tank. Hence,
X = {x}, X˙ = {x˙}, and X ′ = {x′}. The only location that
is marked initial is t1 and Init(t1) : x = 20. An example
flow predicate is Flow(t1) : x˙ = 0, which specifies that the
temperature of the water inside the tank does not change. A
jump predicate assigned to an edge specifies the condition
needed to take a transition and the updating of values of
some continuous variables when the transition is taken. For
example, Jump(t4, τ, t1) : x = 20 ∧ x′ = x specifies that
the transition is taken when the value of the temperature is
20◦C and the updated value of the temperature is also 20◦C.
We now formalise the HA using Definition 1.
Definition 1. A hybrid automata is
H = 〈Loc,Edge,Σ, Inv, F low, Jump〉 where:
• Loc = {l1, .., ln} representing n control modes or locations.
• Edge ⊆ Loc×Σ×Loc are the set of edges between locations.
• Σ = ΣI ∪ ΣO ∪ {τ} is set of event names comprising of
input, output, and internal events.
• Three sets for the set of continuous variables, their rate of
change and their updated values represented as follows:
X = {x1, .., xm}, X˙ = {x˙1, .., ˙xm}, and
X ′ = {x′1, .., x′m}.
• Init(l): Is a predicate whose free variables are from X . It
specifies the possible valuations of these when the HA starts
in l.
• Inv(l): Is a predicate whose free variables are from X and it
constrains these when the HA resides in l.
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• Flow(l): Is a predicate whose free variables are from X ∪ X˙
and it specifies the rate of change of these variables when the
HA resides in l.
• Jump(e): Is a function that assigns to the edge ‘e’ a
predicate whose free variables are fromX∪X ′. This predicate
specifies when the mode switch using ‘e’ is possible. It also
specifies the updated values of the variables when this mode
switch happens.
The semantics of an HA is specified using the notion of
timed transitions systems (TTS) using Definition 2.
Definition 2. The semantics of an HA
H = 〈Loc,Edge,Σ, Inv, F low, Jump〉 is defined by a timed
transition system TTS = 〈Q,Q0,Σ,→〉
• Q is of the form (l, v) where l is a location and v ∈ [X → R]
such that v satisfies Inv(l). Q is called the state-space of H.
• Q0 ⊆ Q of the form (l, v) such that v satisfies Init(l).
• → is the set of transitions consisting of either:
1) Discrete transitions (instantaneous): For each edge
e = (l, σ, l′), we have (l, v) σ→ (l′, v′) if (l, v) ∈ Q,
(l′, v′) ∈ Q and (v, v′) satisfy Jump(e).
2) Continuous transition (delay): For each non-negative real
δ, we have (l, v) δ→ (l, v′) if (l, v) ∈ Q, (l, v′) ∈ Q,
and there is a differentiable function f : [0, δ] → Rm
(which is a witness function of the above transition where
m = |X|) with first derivative f˙ : (0, δ)→ Rm such that
the following conditions hold:
– f(0) = v and f(δ) = v′,
– for all  ∈ (0, δ), f() satisfies Inv(l) and
(f(), f˙()) satisfies Flow(l).
The TTS semantics of an HA encodes the state-space
Q as all possible pairs of the form (l, v), where l is a
location and v is a vector representing the valuation of the
variables. In general, the state-space is infinite as there are
infinite possible valuations of variables within any time-step
δ. Transitions may be any one of two types. (1) Discrete
transitions that lead to a mode switch and these transitions
are instantaneous. This happens when the input event is
present, the guard condition is true and the updates are per-
formed as the transition is taken. (2) Continuous transitions
that capture the passage of time when control resides in a
location.
3 SEMANTIC RESTRICTIONS FOR EFFICIENT CODE
GENERATION
The HA model introduced in the previous section is very
generic, expressive, and hence powerful. However, it has
limitations for code generation. Since we want to generate
code for emulating physical processes, i.e., for PoC design,
the efficient, real-time response of the generated code is
critical.
Another limitation of generic HA must also be carefully
considered for code generation. As argued in the intro-
duction, all known tools (including ones widely used in
industry) solve ODEs at run-time using numeric techniques.
Simulink R© also introduces semantic ambiguities and there
are problems with simulation fidelity, due to the depen-
dence on the step size selected for the numerical solver [11].
For example, a numerical solver may fail to detect the peak
of a continuous variable and may perform backtracking and
other heuristic techniques, that affect the outcome of the
simulation. As a consequence, robust tools, such as Ptolemy,
are advocating the use of techniques such as quantized-
state systems [30] as an alternative to dynamic numerical
simulation.
Considering the difficulty posed by the above issues, we
propose the well-formedness criteria for admitting a sub-
class of HA, that we term Well-formed Hybrid Automata
(WHA), which is amenable to automatic code generation.
Arbitrary predicates for describing invariants and guard
conditions are replaced by more structured conditions in-
spired by clock constraints in timed automata [26]. We also
move away from dynamic numerical solvers and instead
use analytic solutions. Most importantly, we develop a
synchronous semantics for the generated code that provides
key advantages for modular compilation and sound trans-
formations that are semantic preserving.
3.1 Well-formed hybrid automata (WHA)
A set is defined called CV (X) that will be used for creating
constraints over the continuous variables. This is provided
in Definition 3. These constraints are either comparison of
a variable with a natural number or Boolean combinations
of these. Comparisons can only be performed using the
following mathematical operators: <,≤, >,≥.
Definition 3. Given a set of continuous variables X , then a set
of constraints over these variables are defined as follows:
g := x < n|x ≤ n|x > n|x ≥ n|g ∧ g where, n ∈ N and
x ∈ X . CV (X) denotes the set of constraints over X . Without
loss of generality we can extend these constraints to the domain of
rational numbers Q.
A WHA must satisfy the following conditions and are
defined in Definition 4.
• All invariants, jump and init predicates are members of
the set CV (X).
• In HA semantics, when control resides in a location,
there are infinite valuations of variables in any given
interval of time. This makes code generation difficult.
To facilitate code generation, we make evaluations only
at discrete intervals. These intervals correspond to the
ticks of a synchronous program that will be used for
code generation.
• The ODEs which define flow constraints in any location
of the form x˙ = f(x) must be closed form in nature.
This property ensures that such ODEs are analytically
solvable so that the witness functions needed for the
generated code are analytically computable.
• All witness functions must be monotonic. This neces-
sary property ensures that generated code can evaluate
invariants and jump predicates using saturation rather
than backtracking. This is detailed in Section 4.4.
We have defined WHA for both modular code gener-
ation and to enable formal verification, which is not the
focus of the current paper. If only modular code generation
is needed, some of the WHA restrictions may be relaxed
further.
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Definition 4. A well-formed hybrid automata
WHA = 〈Loc,Edge,Σ, Init, Inv, F low, Jump〉 where
• Loc = {l1, .., ln} representing n control modes or locations.
• Σ = ΣI ∪ ΣO ∪ {τ} is the input alphabet comprising of
event names, including internal events.
• Edge ⊆ Loc×Σ×Loc are the set of edges between locations.
• Three sets for the set of continuous variables, their rate of
change and their updated values represented as follows:
X = {x1, .., xm}, X˙ = {x˙1, .., ˙xm}, and
X ′ = {x′1, .., x′m}.
• Init(l): x1 = v1, .., xm = vm where v1..vm ∈ R.
• Inv(l): ∈ CV (X)
• Flow(l): A set of ODEs that meet the closed form re-
quirement. Also, the witness functions of the ODEs are
monotonic.
• Jump(e): This function maps each edge ‘e’ to the conjunc-
tion of a guard and an update. The guard is in CV (X) and
the update is in UP (X,X ′), which specifies the value of the
updated variables.
• Fairness: the system never remains in any location indef-
initely, i.e., if a location invariant holds indefinitely, then
a egress transition is enabled by the controller within a
bounded time.
The semantics of a WHA is also a TTS (Definition 2).
3.2 Background on the synchronous approach
The synchronous approach [16] is widely used for the manage-
ment of concurrency and race conditions. It is, in particular,
applied extensively to the design of safety-critical systems,
such as the embedded software for the Airbus A320 which
uses the SCADE language and associated tools [21].
The synchronous approach is ideal for the development
of reactive systems [31]. A reactive system reacts to its envi-
ronment continuously and, in order to remain reactive, the
speed of the environment must be considered, i.e. outputs
must be produced for the current set of inputs before the
next set of inputs appear.
The synchronous paradigm assumes that the idealised
reactive system produces outputs synchronously relative
to inputs, i.e., the outputs are produced after zero delay.
This is possible if the reactive system executes infinitely
fast relative to its environment, which is known as the
synchrony hypothesis [16]. Based on this hypothesis, time may
be treated as a sequence of discrete instants or ticks with
nothing happening between the completion of the current
tick and the start of the next tick. This idea is prevalent in
various fields of engineering such as digital logic design and
control systems [32]. Typically, the simulation step size of
the ODE solver used for the plant must match the sampling
step size of the controller for correct system simulation [33]
and this aspect is often difficult to achieve. Unlike this, in the
synchronous approach, the notion of synchronous composi-
tion [27] formalises this automatically using compilation
technology.
The synchrony hypothesis is valid so long as the min-
imum inter-arrival time of input events is longer than the
maximum time required to perform a reaction or tick. This
requires the computation of the worst-case reaction time
(WCRT) of the synchronous program [34], [35], [36].
Synchronous languages, which are based on the syn-
chrony hypothesis, include Esterel [37], Lustre [38] and
Signal [39], where every program reaction occurs with re-
spect to a logical clock that ticks. A new reaction starts at
the beginning of a tick by taking a snapshot of the input
signals, computing the outputs using the user specified
logic, and emitting the output signals before the next tick
starts. This is similar to the scan cycle of a programmable
logic controller [27].
3.3 Synchronous HA (SHA)
Because hybrid systems extend reactive systems (which are
usually discrete) with continuous dynamics, we need to
make semantic adaptations to the synchronous model to
facilitate code generation. We make the following assump-
tions:
• All ODEs can be solved using analytic methods to
compute their witness functions.
• Execution is performed in discrete instants based on the
synchronous approach and the duration of each instant
is a fixed time δ.
• Due to the fairness assumption, the execution time
spent in any location is always bounded.
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Fig. 3. An example visualisation of the synchronous approximation. Only
observable at tick boundaries
Based on these assumptions, Definition 5 formalises
the concept of SHA corresponding to any WHA. A SHA
provides an under-approximation of the behaviour of a WHA
(a subset of behaviours) due to the fact that in an SHA,
the valuation of continuous variables are made at discrete
instants and the value remains constant between two dis-
tinct valuations. This is visualised in Figure 3 and shows
that the value of the continuous variable x is evaluated at
discrete instants (or ticks) and remains unchanged between
two instants (or ticks).
We also assume the following notation. Let
V alueInterval = {[N1, N2]|N1 ∈ N ∧ N2 ∈ N}.
Definition 5. Given a well-formed hybrid automata
WHA = 〈Loc,Edge,Σ, Init, Inv, F low, Jump〉 a SHA cor-
responding to this WHA is
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SHA = 〈Loc,Edge,Σ, Init, Inv, Switness, Jump, Step,
Nsteps,BoundryCond〉 where:
• Step = δ ∈ R+: This specifies the duration of the syn-
chronous instant.
• Nsteps : Loc → N: This specifies the maximum number
of (logical) time steps that can be spent in any location.
Nsteps(l) = k implies that during any execution of the
SHA the time spent in l must be less than or equal to k × δ.
• Switness : Loc × N × R × Rm → Rm: is the witness
function that returns the valuation of all the continuous
variables at any valid time step k in a given location l. It
also takes as input the time step δ and the initial value from
which execution begins in the location.
• BoundaryCond : (X × Loc) → V alueInterval: This
function defines the interval in which the boundary value
of any continuous variable lies in a given location. The
boundary value of a continuous variable x is the value of
the variable at time 0, when execution starts in that location,
i.e., x(0).
A SHA is an abstraction of the corresponding WHA. It
inherits all the components of a WHA except that Flow
predicates are replaced by a composite witness function
Switness. Switness(l, k, δ, i) = vk,l,i, which returns the
evaluation of the witness function in location l at time step k.
Here, vk,l,i is a vector representing the valuation of variables
in X . We also denote vk,l,i(x) ∈ R to represent the valuation
of the continuous variable x ∈ X in the k-th step in location
l. We use the shorthand x[k, l, i] to denote vk,l,i(x) and the
shorthand x[k] when the location l and the initial value of x
in vector i, itself denoted as i(x) is clear from the context.
We also introduce some other new components: Step,
Nsteps, and BoundaryCond. Step specifies the duration of
a discrete instant or tick and Nsteps maps every location
to a natural number indicating the worst-case number of
steps possible in that location during any execution of the
SHA. Step can be any value on the positive real-number
line, usually obtained via worst-case reaction time (WCRT)
analysis [34], [35], [36]. Nsteps is computed statically using
an algorithm presented in Section 4.2. BoundaryCond(l, x)
returns a closed interval of the form [N1, N2], which means
that the boundary value of x(0) in location l is in [N1, N2].
This mapping is essential for computing the constants of
integration and is explained in Section 4.2.
The semantics of a Synchronous Hybrid Automata
(SHA) is provided as a Discrete Time Transition System
(DTTS) in Definition 6. We assume that all transitions of
a DTTS trigger relative to the ticks of the logical clock of the
synchronous program.
Definition 6. The semantics of a
SHA = 〈Loc,Edge,Σ, Init, Inv, Switness, Jump, Step,
Nsteps,BoundaryCond〉 is aDTTS = 〈Q,Q0,Σ,→〉 where
• The state-space is Q, where any state is of the form (l, v, i, k)
where l is a location, i is the initial valuation of the variables
when execution begins in the location and v is the valuation
at the k-th instant.
• Q0 ⊆ Q where every q0 ∈ Q0 is of the form (l, v0, i, k)
such that v0 satisfies Init(l).
• Transitions are of two types:
– Inter-location transitions that lead to mode switches:
These are of the form (l, v, i, k) σ→ (l′, v′, i′, 0) if
(l, v, i, k) ∈ Q, (l′, v′, i′, 0) ∈ Q, e = (l σ→ l′) ∈ Edge
and (v, v′) satisfy Jump(e).
– Intra-location transitions made during the execution in a
given mode / location: These are of the form (l, v, i, k) →
(l, v′, i, k + 1) if (l, v, i, k) ∈ Q, (l, v′, i, k + 1) ∈ Q,
(v, v′) satisfy Inv(l), Switness(l, k, δ, i) = v and
Switness(l, k + 1, δ, i) = v′.
3.4 Composition
The developed synchronous semantics enables modular
code generation. We can compile each WHA separately (step
3) in Figure 1 and then the generated codes are linked
together in step 4, which is similar to the linking process
in conventional compilation. We formalise the synchronous
parallel composition of SHAs using Definition 7. This facili-
tates the seamless linking process, described in Section 4.5.
Definition 7. Given
SHA1 = 〈Loc1, Edge1,Σ1, Init1, Inv1, Switness1, Jump1,
Step1, Nsteps1, BoundaryCond1〉 and its semantics
DTTS1 = 〈Q1, Q01,Σ,→1〉 and
SHA2 = 〈Loc2, Edge2,Σ2, Init2, Inv2, Switness2, Jump2,
Step2, Nsteps2, BoundaryCond2〉 and its semantics
DTTS2 = 〈Q2, Q02,Σ2,→2〉 and Sharedv = X1
⋂
X2 and
Sharede = Σ1
⋂
Σ2 denoting a set of shared variables and
events, respectively, which satisfy the following conditions:
1) All writes to shared variables x ∈ Sharedv or the emission
of shared events e ∈ Sharede are mutually exclusive.
2) Any read to a shared variable x ∈ Sharedv or a shared event
e ∈ Sharede accesses the value of the variable / event in the
previous tick, denoted pre(x)/pre(e).
DTTS1||DTTS2 = DTTS〈Q,Q0,Σ,→〉 where:
• The state-space is Q ⊆ Q1 ×Q2.
• Q0 ⊆ Q01 ×Q02.
• Transitions→ are of two types:
– Inter-location transitions of the form:
(Rule Inter-Inter) (q1, q2)
σ1∧σ2→ (q′1, q′2) where
q1 = (l1, v1, i1, k), q2 = (l2, v2, i2, k),
q′1 = (l
′
1, v
′
1, i
′
1, 0), q
′
2 = (l
′
2, v
′
2, i
′
2, 0).
e1 = (q1
σ1→ q′1) ∈ Edge1 and (v1, v′1) satisfy
Jump(e1). e2 = (q2
σ2→ q′2) ∈ Edge2 and (v2, v′2)
satisfy Jump(e2).
(Rule Inter-Intra) (q1, q2)
σ1→ (q′1, q′2) where
q1 = (l1, v1, i1, k), q2 = (l2, v2, i2, k),
q′1 = (l
′
1, v
′
1, i
′
1, 0), q
′
2 = (l2, v
′
2, i
′
2, 0).
e1 = (q1
σ1→ q′1) ∈ Edge1 and (v1, v′1) satisfy
Jump(e1). q2, q′2 ∈ Q2 and (v2, v′2) satisfy Inv(l2).
Finally, i′2 = v2 and v
′
2 = v2.
(Rule Intra-Inter) (q1, q2)
σ2→ (q′1, q′2) where
q1 = (l1, v1, i1, k), q2 = (l2, v2, i2, k),
q′1 = (l1, v
′
1, i
′
1, 0), q
′
2 = (l
′
2, v
′
2, i
′
2, 0).
e2 = (q2
σ2→ q′2) ∈ Edge2 and (v2, v′2) satisfy
Jump(e2). q1, q′1 ∈ Q1 and (v1, v′1) satisfy Inv(l1).
Finally, i′1 = v1 and v
′
1 = v1.
– Intra-location transitions of the form:
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HA
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Fig. 4. Process for compiling a single Hybrid Automata (HA)
(Rule Intra-Intra) (q1, q2)→ (q′1, q′2) where
q1 = (l1, v1, i1, k), q2 = (l2, v2, i2, k),
q′1 = (l1, v
′
1, i1, k + 1), q
′
2 = (l2, v
′
2, i2, k + 1), and
q1, q
′
1 ∈ Q1, (v1, v′1) satisfy Inv(l1),
Switness(l1, k, δ, i1) = v1 and
Switness(l1, k + 1, δ, i1) = v
′
1. Similarly, q2, q
′
2 ∈ Q2,
(v2, v
′
2) satisfy Inv(l2), Switness(l2, k, δ, i2) = v2
and Switness(l2, k + 1, δ, i2) = v′2 for any δ.
In Definition 7, the DTTS corresponding to two SHAs
composed in parallel is computed by composing their re-
spective DTTSs. The state-space Q of the resultant DTTS
is a subset of the product of the state-space of the in-
dividual constituents. The initial state-space Q0 is also a
subset of the product of the initial state-space of the con-
stituents. The transition relation consists of two types of
transitions. The inter-location transitions happen when any
one of the constituents or both constituents make an inter-
location transition (there are three different possibilities).
Rule Inter-Inter states that both constituents can take
a discrete transition to new locations.
Rule Inter-Intra states that when the first con-
stituent Q1 takes an inter-location transition from location
l1 to l′1, Q2 is also forced to make such a transition. But, the
resultant location of Q2 does not change, i.e., Q2 can only
take a transition from l2 to l2. Moreover, upon taking the
transition the initial value i2 is set to the current valuation
v2, consequently implying that v′2 = v2. Once in the new
state (l′1, l2) vectors v1 and v2 start evolving according
to their individual witness functions. Rule Intra-Inter
is the dual of Rule Inter-Intra. Finally, intra-location
transition in the composition (Rule Intra-Intra) hap-
pens only when both constituents make an intra-location
transition.
4 METHODOLOGY FOR CODE GENERATION
Figure 4 outlines the approach used to compile a single HA.
The compilation process consists of three steps. We describe
all three steps, in Sections 4.1-4.3, using the water tank HA,
which has been reproduced in Figure 5(a).
4.1 Static analysis of hybrid automata
Given an HA, the first step (Figure 4) in the compilation
process is to statically determine if the well-formedness
criteria defined in Section 3.1 is respected. If the HA does
not respect the well-formedness criteria, then an error is
generated.
x˙ = 0
x = 20
t1
initial
x˙ = K(h− x)
20 ≤ x ≤ 100
t2
x˙ = 0
x = 100
t3
x˙ = −Kx
20 ≤ x ≤ 100
t4
ON , x′ = x
τ, x = 100 ∧ x′ = x
OFF , x′ = x
τ, x = 20 ∧ x′ = x
OFF
, x ′
=
x
ON
, x ′
=
x
(a) Hybrid Automata (HA), see Definition 1. Reproduced from Figure 2(c).
Symbols K and h are constants with values 0.075 and 150, respectively.
x(t) = 20
x(0) ∈ [20,20]
x = 20
t1
initial
x(t) = F1(t,C1)
x(0) ∈ [20,100]
20 ≤ x ≤ 100t2
x(t) = 100
x(0) ∈ [100,100]
x = 100 t3
x(t) = F2(t,C1)
x(0) ∈ [20,100]
20 ≤ x ≤ 100
t4
ON, x′ = x
τ, x = 100 ∧ x′ = x
OFF, x′ = x
τ, x = 20 ∧ x′ = x
OFF, x ′
=
x
ON, x ′
=
x
(b) Synchronous Hybrid Automata (SHA), see Definition 5. Flow pred-
icates are described using witness functions. Values of the constants h
and K are 150 and 0.075, respectively. Furthermore, witness function
F1 = C1e−0.075×t + 150.0 and F2 = C1e−0.075×t
t1
initial
x[0] = 20,
k = 0
t2 t3
t4
O
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x
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,x
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x
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],
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x[0]=x[k],k=0
O
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x
[k
],
x
[0
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x
[k
],
k
=
0
ON∧OFF∧(20≤x[k]≤100)
x[k+1]=F1(δ,k,C1),k=k+1
ON∧OFF∧(x[k]=100)
x[k+1]=x[k],k=k+1
ON∧OFF∧(x[k]=100)
x[k+1]=F2(δ,k,C1),k=k+1
ON∧OFF∧(x[k]=20)
x[k+1]=x[k],k=k+1
O
F
F
C
1=
x[k],x[0]=
x[k],k=
0
O
N
C
1=
x[k]−
150,x[0]=
x[k],k=
0
(c) Synchronous Witness Automata (SWA). We abuse the notation x[k]
to update the value of x, although x[k] represents the valuation of the
continuous variable x. This physical time t = k×δ, where k is the logical
tick and δ is the tick length.
Fig. 5. The water tank component from the running example
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Algorithm 1 The algorithm to check the well-formedness
criteria of a HA
Input: HA ha
Output: Boolean
1: gset← ∅
2: for all edges ∈ ha do
3: for all guards ∈ edges do
4: gset← gset ∪ guards
5: end for
6: end for
7: for all loc ∈ ha do
8: for all invs ∈ loc do
9: gset← gset ∪ invs
10: end for
11: end for
12: // check that all location invariants and jump conditions
are of type CV (X)
13: for all g ∈ gset do
14: assert type(g) ∈ CV (X)
15: end for
16: for all loc ∈ ha do
17: for all ode ∈ loc do
18: if solve ode(ode) then
19: (R1, R2)← solve(ode.rhs > 0) 2
20: (R′1, R
′
2)← solve(ode.rhs < 0)
21: [N1, N2]← get inv bounds(ode, loc)
22: if (R1, R2) ∩ [N1, N2] 6= ∅ ∧ (R′1, R′2) ∩ [N1, N2] 6= ∅
then
23: // Slope of witness function changes sign
24: throw Exception (“Not a WHA”)
25: else
26: return True
27: end if
28: else
29: // No closed form solution, hence not a WHA
30: throw Exception(“Not a WHA”)
31: end if
32: end for
33: end for
The procedure to verify the well-formedness criteria is
presented in Algorithm 1, which takes an HA as input.
Three well-formedness criteria need to be guaranteed. First,
the invariants and the jump conditions need to be of the
form CV (X) (Definition 3). Lines 2-15 guarantee that this
criterion is met. The second and third criteria require that
each ODE, in every location, of the HA should have a closed
form solution and should be monotonic. Lines 16-33 ensure
that these criteria are satisfied.
Consider the running example HA – the water tank
system presented in Figure 5(a). Lines 2-15 in Algorithm 1
collect all the invariant and jump conditions from the loca-
tions and the edges, respectively. Once collected in set gset,
an assertion statement guarantees that all these conditions
are of the form CV (X) (line 14). Lines 16-33 iterate through
each location of the HA. Upon visiting a location, all ODEs
within the location are solved symbolically (line 18). If no
closed form solution exists, then an exception is generated
(line 30).
Given that a closed form solution exists, we then guaran-
tee that all ODEs in a location are monotonic (not necessarily
strictly monotonic). We use the definition that any given
(witness) function is considered monotonic if and only if
the first derivative of the function does not change sign [40].
Flow conditions evolve one or more ODEs within a given lo-
cation as long as the invariant on the location is not violated.
Hence, in our case, the definition of a monotonic function
can be made more specific: any given (witness) function is
monotonic if and only if its first derivative does not change
sign within the interval specified by the invariant(s) of the
location.
The right hand side of the ODEs specify the first deriva-
tives of the witness functions. We need to ensure that the
right hand side expression of the ODE (the slope) does not
change signs within the invariant bounds. The lines 19-24
ensure that these conditions are satisfied. Line 19 obtains
the real number line interval (denoted by (R1, R2)) such
that the derivative of the witness function is always greater
than zero, i.e., an increasing function. Line 20 obtains the
real number line interval (denoted by (R′1, R
′
2)), such that
the first derivative of the witness function is less than zero.
Next, we obtain the invariant interval (denoted [N1, N2]),
bounding the value of the evolving variable in the ODE,
from the invariant(s) on the location. A non-empty interval
(R1, R2) ∩ [N1, N2] indicates that the witness function is
increasing within the location intervals. Similarly, a non-
empty interval (R′1, R
′
2) ∩ [N1, N2] indicates that the wit-
ness function is a decreasing function within the location
invariants. If both sets are non-empty, the witness function
increases and decreases within the invariants specified on
the location, and hence, the witness function is not mono-
tonic.
Consider the running example in Figure 5(a) and specif-
ically consider location t2. The steps to determine if the
witness function in location t2 is monotonic are as follows:
1) Compute the real number line interval for x such that
the right hand side of the ODE is strictly greater
than zero: x ∈ solve((0.075 ∗ (150− x) > 0) results in
x ∈ (−∞, 150)
2) Compute the real number line interval for x such
that the right hand side of the ODE is strictly less
than zero: x ∈ solve((0.075 ∗ (150− x) < 0) results in
x ∈ (150,∞)
3) Obtain the invariant bounds on x: For location t2, this
interval is obtained from invariant: 20 ≤ x ≤ 100.
Hence, the invariant bounds are: x ∈ [20, 100].
4) Check if the witness function is monotonic: The
intersection (−∞, 150) ∩ [20, 100] = [20, 100], but
(150,∞) ∩ [20, 100] = ∅, and hence, the witness
function in location t2 is an increasing (and monotonic)
function.
For the running example in Figure 5(a), all the well-
formedness criteria are satisfied and hence, the water tank
system is a WHA.
4.2 Generation of SHA
This section describes step 2 in the compilation procedure
from Figure 4. Once a given HA is is determined to be a
WHA, an SHA is generated from the WHA. This procedure
translates all ODEs in every location of the WHA into their
2. solve is a polymorphic function from Sympy (a python library)
that can be used to solve many different types of problems. We make
use of the polymorphic nature of solve in Algorithms 1 and 2
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Algorithm 2 The algorithm to generate a SHA from a WHA
Input: HA ha
Output: SHA sha
1: for all loc ∈ ha do
2: for all ode ∈ loc do
3: times← ∅
4: eq ← solve ode(ode)
5: ode← eq
6: if sign(diff(eq, t)) > 0 then
7: times← times ∪ solve(eq,min(Init),max(Inv))
8: else if sign(diff(eq, t)) < 0 then
9: times← times ∪ solve(eq,max(Init),min(Inv))
10: else
11: raise Warning (“Fairness required”)
12: times← ∅
13: break
14: end if
15: end for
16: if min(times) =∞ then
17: raise Warning (“Fairness required”)
18: end if
19: end for
20: return this
closed form solutions (witness functions). It also computes
the worst-case bound Nsteps (if one exists) as defined in
Definition 5.
The procedure to generate the SHA from a WHA is
presented in Algorithm 2. The algorithm visits every loca-
tion in the WHA. For each ODE in the location, a witness
function is obtained (line 4). Next, the algorithm attempts
to determine the maximum time that the HA will spend in
every location (lines 6-18) in the worst-case. The algorithm
first detects the slope of each ODE (ode in Algorithm 2) for
any given location (loc in Algorithm 2), by differentiating
the witness function with respect to time t (line 6). If the
slope is increasing (line 6) then the witness function (eq in
Algorithm 2) is solved for t. We do the reverse for an ODE
with decreasing slope (line 9). If the slope is constant, in
case of a non-changing ODE, a warning is raised stating that
egress (fairness) condition is needed to make progress out
of the location (line 11). Given the various worst-case times
in the set times, for all ODEs in a location, the minimum
value amongst times needs to be bounded to guarantee at
compile time that Nsteps is bounded, otherwise an egress
condition is needed to make progress out of the location
(line 17).
Consider the example of the SHA shown in Figure 5(b).
The algorithm visits each location in the WHA (Figure 5(a))
and replaces each ODE with its equivalent closed form
solution (Algorithm 2, line 5). The closed form solution of
all ODEs for the water tank is shown in Figure 5(b), given
h = 150 and K = 0.075, respectively.
Consider location t1 in Figure 5(b). Line 6, in Algo-
rithm 2, differentiates the witness function with respect to
time (t), resulting in a sign of 0, indicating a non-changing
witness function. Hence, a warning that an egress transition
is needed to make progress out of location t1 is raised. This
is expected, because as seen in Figure 5(a), the ODE x˙ = 0
does not change the value of x and the invariant x = 20
holds, hence progress out of location t1 is only possible upon
reception of (egress) event ON.
Similarly, differentiating the witness function with re-
spect to time in location t4, gives the solution −0.075× C1,
where C1 is the constant of integration. In our frame-
work, the programmer annotates every location with the
possible range of (initial) values that the continuous vari-
able(s) might take upon entering the location. For example,
BoundaryCond(t4, x) is denoted as x(0) ∈ [20, 100] for
location t43. Given that the initial value interval is positive,
the slope of the witness function is detected to be negative
(since C1 can only take a positive value) and hence, the
witness function in location t4 is a decreasing function. Once
this is deduced, the worst-case time spent in location t4 is
computed at line 9, in Algorithm 2, by substituting the initial
value of x as the maximum value from the ValueInternal, i.e.,
x(0) = max(20, 100) = 100 and the final value of x as the
minimum value from amongst the invariant on x in location
t4, i.e., x(t) = min(20, 100) = 20.
Given that the witness function x(t) is a decreasing
function with an initial value of 100, we compute, using
solve on line 9, the time t it takes for function x(t) to
reach its final value 20. This time t, if it can be computed,
gives the maximum time that the system will remain in
location t4 before making progress to a new location. The
solve procedure proceeds as follows:
1) Compute the value of the constant of integration: For lo-
cation t4, x(t) = C1 × e−0.075×t as shown in Fig-
ure 5(b). First of all, we compute the constant of
integration, using the initial value x(0) = 100 ⇒
100 = C1 × e−0.075×0. Therefore, C1 = 100 and hence
x(t) = 100× e−0.075×t.
2) Computing time t: Once, we have computed the con-
stant of integration, we can easily compute the time t
required for x(t) to decrease from 100 to 20 as follows:
x(t) = 20⇒ 20. Therefore, 20 = 100×e−0.075×t. Hence
t =
ln( 20100 )
−0.075 , t ≈ 214.6.
The system will make progress out of location t4, in the
worst-case, after approximately, 214.6 units of time. Simi-
larly, we can bound the worst-case time spent in a location
with increasing, rather than decreasing witness functions.
In case a location consists of multiple witness functions,
the worst-case time spent in that location is the minimum
amongst the worst-case times computed for all the witness
functions in that location. If the minimum amongst all the
worst-case times is∞, then a warning stating that an egress
transition is necessary to make progress out of a location is
generated as seen on line 17 in Algorithm 2.
4.3 Backend code generation
Finally, we describe the last step, step 3, in the compilation
procedure presented in Figure 4. After the verification of
WHA requirements and the generation of the SHA, backend
code is generated. In the backend, the SHA is represented as
a Synchronous Witness Automata (SWA), which captures the
behaviour of the SHA as a synchronous state machine. The
SWA is a discrete variant which, when executed, produces
3. The possible initial value intervals can be computed automatically
from the HA, but describing this is out of the scope of this paper.
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the desired behaviour as a DTTS (Definition 6). During the
execution, a task known as saturation may also be needed
while taking discrete transitions. This is formalised in Sec-
tion 4.4. The SWA is formalised using Definition 9. We start
by defining CV (X[k]) in Definition 8 that is essential for the
definition of the transition relation of an SWA.
Definition 8. Let x[k] denote the k-th (k ∈ N ) valuation of
any variable x ∈ X and let X[k] denote the set of all such k-
valuations of variables in X .
We denote CV (X[k]) the set of constraints over X[k] :
g := x[k] < n|x[k] ≤ n|x[k] > n|x[k] ≥ n|g∧g where, n ∈ N.
Definition 9. A synchronous witness automata (SWA)
S = 〈S, S0,Σ, X, Updates,→〉, which corresponds to the
SHA = 〈Loc,Edge,Σ, Init, Inv, Switness, Jump, Step,
Nsteps,BoundaryCond〉 where
• S denotes the set of states of S and S = Loc.
• So is a subset of initial states.
• Σ is a set of events.
• X is a set of continuous variables
• Updates represent a set of updates. A given update may
capture the emission of an output event, the update of a state
variable in a given tick using its witness function or the
initialization of an integration constant or the time instant.
• →⊆ S × B(Σ) × CV (X[k]) × 2Updates × S represents
the transition relation. Here B(Σ) denotes the set of Boolean
formulas over Σ.
We use the shorthand, (s, e∧gu , s
′) to represent transi-
tions. Here, e ∈ B(Σ), g ∈ CV (X[k]) and u ∈ 2Updates.
The generated C-code is an SWA. The SWA for the water
tank generated from the SHA (Figure 5(b)) is shown in
Figure 5(c). Every location in the SHA has an equivalent
state in the SWA, as shown in Figure 5(c). Furthermore, the
witness functions in the locations of the SHA are moved
to transitions in the SWA. For example, the SWA self-
transition from state t2 to t2 represents the evolution of the
continuous variable x in discrete steps k ∈ [0, Nsteps). In
the SWA of Figure 5(c), we label the transitions with the
form: antecedentconsequent . The self-transition from state t2 to state
t2 is labeled as:
ON∧OFF∧(20≤x[k]≤100)
x[k+1]=F1(δ,k,C1),k=k+1
, which states that
while the value of x at tick k is between 20 and 100 and
no events (ON or OFF) are detected, x evolves to the new
value depending upon the witness function F1. C1 is the
constant of integration. The transition guard has a one-to-
one correspondence with the invariant condition on location
t2 in Figure 5(b). We add self-transitions to all states of the
generated SWA, which evolve all the continuous variables in
the corresponding location in the SHA. The generated SWA
also consists of all the edges from the SHA, e.g., transition
(t1,
ON∧x[k]=20
C1=x[k]−150,x[0]=x[k],k=0 , t2), which corresponds to the
jump and updates on the transition between locations t1
and t2 in the corresponding SHA in Figure 5(b).
The C-code representing the SWA in Figure 5(c) is shown
in Figure 6. We have only shown the states t1 and t4 along
with their associated transitions and functions. There is
a literal one-to-one correspondence between the SWA in
Figure 5(c) and the C-code in Figure 6. We use the variables
x and x u to denote the x[k] and x[k + 1] valuations of the
double t4_ode_1(double d, double k, double C1){
return C1*exp(-0.075*d*k);
}
double t4_init_1(double x_u){
return = x_u;
}
enum states watertankR(enum states cstate,
enum states pstate){
switch (cstate){
case (t1):
if(x == 20 && !ON && !OFF){
if (pstate != cstate) C1 = t1_init_1(x);
x_u = t1_ode_1(C1);
k=k+1;
cstate = t1;
}
else if(!OFF){
k=1; cstate=t2; x_u = x;
}
break;
case (t2): ...
case (t3): ...
case (t4):
if(x >= 20 && x <= 100 && !ON && !OFF){
if (pstate != cstate) C1 = t4_init_1(x);
x_u = t4_ode_1(d, k, C1);
k=k+1;
cstate = t4;
}
else if(ON){
k=0; cstate=t2; x_u = x;
}
else if(x == 20){
k=0; cstate=t1; x_u = x;
}
break;
}
return cstate;
}
Fig. 6. C-code generated for the SHA in Figure 5(c)
continuous variable x, respectively. The witness functions
are represented as functions in C (e.g., lines 1-10 in Figure 6).
The witness functions are incomplete, in the sense that
the value of the constant of integration (e.g., C1 on line 3)
needs to be computed. Computing this constant of integra-
tion is equivalent to solving the initial value problem. It is
well known that the value of the constant of integration,
in the witness function, depends upon the initial value of
the witness function. The initial value, at time 0, of any
witness function is either: (1) the specified initial value of
the continuous variable that the witness function updates,
as shown in Figure 5(c) with the dashed arrow, or (2) the
updated value of the continuous variable on an Inter
location transition.
Consider the two transitions, one from location t2 to t4
and the other from t4 to t2 in Figure 5(c). Variable x is
updated by the witness function F2 on the self-transition
in state t4. Function F2 takes as input arguments the current
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tick number, k ∈ N, the step size of the tick, δ ∈ R+, and
the constant of integration. The argument k starts from 0
and δ is a constant. We determine the value of the constant
of integration when entering state t4, by making C1 the
subject. Since F2 = C1 × eδ×k×−0.075, we set k = 0 and
making C1 the subject gives C1 = F2(0), i.e., C1 takes the
value of x[0], which as we know from Figure 5(b) is the final
value of x in the previous state, since x′ = x. Hence, we
get C1 = x[k]. In Figure 6, the constant of integration C1
is updated whenever any state is entered for the first time
(line 16) this corresponds to the update of the constants of
integration on the transitions in Figure 5(c).
4.4 Saturation
Due to the discrete/synchronous valuation of variables,
when control remains in one location the variable may reach
a value which will never satisfy the guard condition of the
egress transition. This phenomena depends on the location
invariant and the guard and may not happen frequently.
Figure 7 illustrates three separate cases.
Case 1: Consider the step size δ as 1, the invariant at location
t1 in Figure 7(a) is x ≤ 120 and the jump condition isA∧x >
100. According to the non-deterministic semantics of hybrid
automata, the value of x, as it leaves location t1, can be
in the interval (100, 120] when the signal A is present. The
value of x is plotted against time in Figure 7(d) (top). In the
synchronous approximation (shown as points), we have two
scenarios. (1) If the transition is taken at the 5th tick (time
equals 4 seconds), the value of x as it leaves location t1
is 111.2, respectively. (2) Otherwise, at the 6th tick (time
equals 5 ) the value of x is saturated to 120 and is forced to
exit location t1. Note that the trace due to the synchronous
approximation is different but, still a valid trace of the HA.
This example satisfies the restrictions proposed by
Alur et al. [23] and will be accepted for code generation.
Here, the duration between the occurrence of the jump con-
dition evaluating to true and the occurrence of the invariant
evaluating to false is longer than the tick length (sampling
period). This restriction ensures that there is always at least
one valid state where a discrete transition can be taken.
However, the above restriction may not always hold as
illustrated in the following case.
Case 2: Given the step size as 1, Figure 7(b) illustrates a
case where we must saturate. Figure 7(d) shows the value
of y increasing steadily to 50 and then remaining at 50. In
contrast to Case 1, for location t3 the duration between the
guard (y = 50) evaluating to true and the occurrence of the
invariant evaluating to false (y < 50) is zero. This violates
the restrictions proposed in [23] and this HA would not be
accepted in their framework. In Simulink R©, this HA may
not be simulated correctly because of the equality check.
In fact, for two out of seven benchmarking examples, we
observed incorrect behaviour in Simulink R© (see Table 2 in
Section 5).
In the synchronous approximation, we accept this HA
because of the proposed saturation technique. In our ap-
proach, during the 4th tick the value of y is below 50 and
the guard condition is not satisfied. During the 5th tick the
value of y is above 50 and without saturation this leads to an
unreachable state because neither the invariant (y < 50) of
t3 nor the guard (y = 50) are valid. To address this problem,
at the start of the 5th tick, we saturate the value of y to
exactly 50. Hence, a value greater than 50 is not observed
between ticks 4 and 5. By using saturation, unlike [23], we
are agnostic to the step size (sampling period).
Case 3: Similar to Case 1, Figure 7(c) illustrates a decreasing
function. Once again, the duration between the occurrence
of the guard evaluating to true and the occurrence of the
invariant evaluating to false is longer than the step size
(sampling period). This restriction ensures that there always
exists at least one valid state where a discrete transition can
be taken. This HA is accepted for code generation by [23]
and by our tool Piha.
Definition 10 formalises this saturation technique.
Definition 10. In any discrete time instant k, when execution
makes a discrete switch from state l to l′ in the SWA, the valuation
of all continuous variables X[k] either satisfy the guard condition
g ∈ CV (X[k]) or are set to a suitable value such that g is
satisfied. This is termed as saturation.
According to the above definition, during the execution
of the backend code, we must decide dynamically when
to saturate and also must decide on the correct value. This
decision is based on the following Lemma that ensures that
the value of x[k] that satisfies the guard always exists in the
current discrete step.
Lemma 1. It is always possible to uniquely determine the satu-
ration value for any continuous variable at time instant k when
the state (location) switch from l to l′ is to be taken in a SWA.
Proof. The proof of this lemma follows from the following
observations.
• Observation 1: All witness functions x(t) for any x ∈ X
are monotonic in every location (WHA requirement).
• Observation 2: All witness functions x(t) for any x ∈ X
are continuous as they are differentiable in any interval.
• Observation 3: Given the above two observations, the
saturation value for any variable x always exists in the
time interval [(k−1)×δ, k×δ] when the location switch
happens at instant k × δ.
4.5 Composition of SHAs
This section describes the modular compilation of SHAs
using the composition rules defined in Definition 7. Let
us consider a part of the water tank and gas burner HAs
as shown in Figure 8(a). The equivalent partial SHAs for
these two HAs are shown in Figure 8(b). As described
previously, in Section 4.2, the ODEs (flow predicates) in each
location have been replaced with their individual witness
functions. We can furthermore compile these SHAs into
individual SWAs as shown in Figure 8(c). The composition
rules defined in Definition 7 are applied on these resultant
SWAs to generate a single SWA shown in Figure 8(d).
The pseudo-code used to compose two SWAs is shown
in Algorithm 3. The algorithm takes as input two SWAs:
Q1 and Q2, respectively. In case of N SWAs, the compo-
sition procedure is applied recursively. As the very first
step, the algorithm builds the cross product of all states
in the constituent SWAs Q1 and Q2 (line 1). Next, the
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x˙ = 0.2x
x ≤ 120
t1
x˙ = 0
x ≥ 100
t2
A, x > 100intial
x(0) = 50
(a) Case 1: an increasing function and it does not need saturation
y˙ = 8.5
y < 50
t3
y˙ = 0
y >= 50
t4
intial
y(0) = 20
τ, y = 50
(b) Case 2: due to equality there is a need for saturation
z˙ = −5.5
z > −30
t5
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z(0) = 0
A, z < −10
(c) Case 3: a decreasing function and it does not need saturation
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(d) The behaviours of the three example HAs are depicted using
solid lines. Our synchronous approximations are depicted using
dashed lines. Each tick is one second long.
Fig. 7. The need for saturation depends on the location invariant, the guard in HA, and the step size. Out of the three cases, only Case 2 requires
saturation, see Figure 7(d).
Algorithm 3 The pseudo-code used to compose two SWAs
Input: SWA Q1, Q2
1: Qc ← Q1 ×Q2
// Apply Rule Intra-Intra
2: for all q ∈ Qc do
3: build self transition(q)
4: end for
// Apply Rule Intra-Inter
5: for all q1 ∈ Qc do
6: (l1, l2)← q1
7: for all q2 ∈ Qc ∧ q1 6= q2 do
8: (l′1, l
′
2)← q2
9: if l1 = l′1 ∧ l2 6= l′2 then
10: build transition(q1, q2)
11: end if
12: end for
13: end for
// Rule Inter-Intra is similar to the
Rule Intra-Inter
intra-location and inter-location rules from Definition 7 are
applied sequentially.
The very first rule that we apply is the intra-location
transition rule (Rule Intra-Intra). The application of
this rule simply requires one to iterate through each state
in the product set Qc, building self-transitions on states.
The example of the application of Rule Intra-Intra is
shown in Figure 8(d). Given state (t2, b4) in the resultant
SWA; a self-transition from (t2, b4) to (t2, b4) is introduced.
This transition indicates the simultaneous evolution of the
ODEs from individual states t2 and b4 from the constituent
SWAsQ1 andQ2, respectively. As seen from Figure 8(d), the
continuous variables x and y evolve together according to
their individual witness functions from the self-transitions
on states t2 and b4 in Figure 8(c), provided that the conjunc-
tion of the individual guards holds.
Next, we apply the three inter-location rules se-
quentially. Algorithm 3 only shows the application of
Rule Intra-Inter, since other rules can be trivially de-
rived from this rule. The algorithm traverses through each
state of the the product set Qc. Upon visiting a state q1,
the state label is first decomposed into its constituent parts
(line 6). For the running example, given q1 = (t2, b4), line 6,
gives l1 = t2 and l2 = b4, respectively. Next, we iterate
through all the states in Qc other than state q1, again de-
composing the state label into its constituent location names,
l′1 and l
′
2, respectively at line 8. Rule Intra-Inter states
that the second SWA Q2 makes an inter-location transition.
SWA Q1 on the other hand is forced to make a transition,
such that the destination state after the transition has the
same location label as the source transition state. Hence,
the algorithm builds transitions from state q1 to any state
q2 such that the constituent label l1 of state q1 and l′1 of
state q2 are the same, but l2 and l′2 are different. The result
of application of such a rule is shown in Figure 8(c), as
transition (t2b4,
ON∧OFF∧(0≤x[k]≤100)∧(y[k]= 110 )
y[k+1]=y[k],x[0]=x[k],OFF,k=0 , t2b1). The
second SWA Q2 takes a discrete transition, forcing the first
one to also take a discrete transition. This transition is only
to a state where the location of the first SWA (Q1) does
not change. The guards on this transition are a conjunction
of the set of individual guards. We add a special update
x[0] = x[k], which carries the value of the continuous vari-
able x. Note that the update x[0] = x[k] is the consequence
of i′1 = v1 in Rule Intra-Inter.
5 RESULTS
We compare the efficacy of the proposed approach (our
tool Piha) with Simulink. In particular we compare the
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performance of these two tools relative to execution time
and code size. For the purposes of this comparison, we use
the seven benchmarks presented in Table 1. These bench-
marks span across different application domains such as
medical, physics, and industrial automation, illustrating the
diversity of the proposed approach. In our setting we mean
IOHA [29] when we state HA. IOHA enable the modelling
of the plant and the controller separately.
As depicted in column one of Table 1, four out of the
seven benchmarks are described using a single HA and the
remaining three examples are described using more than
one HA. The table also presents the number of locations
(#L) in each hybrid automata. For example, (2,3) denotes
that the Train Gate Control (TG) benchmark is described
using a HA with two locations and a second HA with
three locations. More details about the benchmarks and
their implementation in Piha and Simulink are available
online [41].
5.1 Experimental set-up
The following steps are considered in order to achieve a fair
comparison between Piha and Simulink.
Solver To reflect the synchronous execution model, we used
a discrete solver with a fixed step in Simulink. The
Discrete-Time Integrator block is configured to use the
Forward Euler method. Other methods such as Back-
ward Euler and Trapezoidal resulted in an “algebraic
loop” error and we did not pursue a solution to this.
Step size For all benchmarks the step size in Simulink is
fixed to 0.01 seconds. Also the same step size is used in
Piha, δ = 0.01 seconds.
Time All benchmarks were simulated in Simulink for
100, 000 seconds of simulation time. Based on a step
size of 0.01 seconds, in Piha this translates to 10 million
ticks.
The experiments are executed on an Intel i7 processor
with 16 GB RAM running the Windows 7 operating system.
5.2 Evaluation
For all the benchmarks, the executable for the Simulink
models are generated using the in-built C code generator.
It automatically generates equivalent C code and compiles
it to produce an executable. Similarly, Piha generates equiv-
alent C code and generates an executable using GCC. The
execution time and the code size of the generated executa-
bles are reported below.
Execution time: Figure 9(a) shows that for all bench-
marks, the execution times of Piha are significantly shorter
than Simulink. On average, Piha is 3.9 times faster than
Simulink. The most significant difference between the tools
is observed for the most complex example (most locations),
the water tank heating system (WH). For this example, the
execution time of Piha is 7.3 times faster than Simulink.
Code size: Figure 9(a) shows that for all benchmarks,
the code size of Piha is significantly smaller than Simulink.
On average, the generated code is 40% smaller than the
Simulink code. The most significant difference is 47% which
is observed for the Thermostat (TS) example. In general,
Simulink is a more feature rich tool and there may be some
TABLE 2
What benchmarks can be accepted based on the restrictions of the tool
in [23] and our tool Piha.
Benchmarks Tool in [23] Piha
Thermostat (TS) Yes Yes
Switch Tank (ST) Yes Yes
Heart Cell (HC) Yes Yes
Train Brake control (TB) Yes Yes
Water Heating system (WH) No Yes
Train Gate control(TG) No Yes
Nuclear Plant control (NP) Yes Yes
overheads during code generation where numerical solvers
are linked during compilation.
In summary, on average Piha is faster (in execution time)
than Simulink by a factor of 3.9 times and the generated
code is 40% smaller than the Simulink code. In the future,
we will extend our benchmark suite with more complex
examples and quantitatively compare with Ptolemy and
Ze´lus.
Finally, in Table 2 we qualitatively compare the accept-
ability of the benchmarks between our tool and the tool
based on [23]. As discussed earlier in the introduction and
Section 4.4, the tool in [23] requires that “a given mode and
the corresponding guard of any switch must overlap for a
duration that is greater than the sampling period” [23]. Due
to this restriction, it is not possible to accept any HA that has
a guard condition that checks for equality. For the running
example (Figure 2(c)), the guard condition x = 100 checks
if the water has reached the boiling point. Similarly, in the
train gate control benchmark, there is a guard condition that
checks if the gate height is exactly equal to 10 meters. In
summary, due to our saturation function, we can accept a
larger set of benchmarks for code generation than the tool
in [23].
6 CONCLUSIONS
Hybrid automata (HA) [4] is a very well known frame-
work for the modelling and verification of Cyber-physical
Systems (CPS) [2]. The primary focus of the current work
is the emulation of controllers using plant models that
provide real-time closed-loop response, while validating the
controllers in a CPS. We term such plant models as plant-
on-a-chip (PoC).
HA was initially developed for the simulation / ver-
ification of CPS where both the plant and the controller
are considered as a single HA. We seek to validate con-
trollers using emulation of the plant. Variants such as input
/ output HA [29] (IOHA) are proposed to specify both
the plant and the adjoining controller and this work has
recently been used for the validation of controllers such
as pacemakers [28]. The majority of controller validation
approaches use tools such as Simulink for the modelling and
code generation of the plant to validate the controller. There
are well known semantic limitations of using such tools for
validation. Tools such as Ptolemy [13] and Ze´lus [12], on
the other hand, are founded on formal semantics. However,
they have limitations for emulating plants due to the dy-
namic interaction with numerical solvers. There have also
been some prior work on automatic code generation from
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TABLE 1
Benchmark descriptions
Benchmarks Domain # L Description
Si
ng
le
H
A
Thermostat (TS) Physics [42] 2 Heats a room to keep it warm.
Switch Tank (ST) Physics [43] 2 A hose adding water by switching between two leaky tanks.
Heart Cell (HC) Biology [44] 4 Captures the electrical behaviour of a cardiac cell.
Train Brake control (TB) Industrial automation [45] 2 Maintains a train’s speed between the upper and lower limit.
Tw
o
H
A
s
Water Heating system (WH) Physics [3] 4 , 4 Models the heating of water (see Figure 2)
Train Gate control(TG) Industrial automation [46] 2, 3 Models the behaviour of a gate at a rail road crossing.
Nuclear Plant control (NP) Industrial automation [2] 3, 3 Switches between two fuel rods to avoid a meltdown.
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Fig. 9. Comparing the execution time (in ms) and code size (in KB) of
Simulnk and Piha for the benchmarks in Table 1.
HA models [23], [24]. However, these approaches handle
very restrictive set of examples.
This paper formulates the problem of emulation of CPS
using automated algorithmic techniques for code genera-
tion from IOHA models. We firstly defined a set of well-
formedness criteria that are specifically developed for fa-
cilitating code generation. We also propose a discrete time
semantics of well-formed HA (WHA) based on the syn-
chronous approach [16]. Based on this semantics and an
approach for synchronous composition of HA models, also
proposed here, we are able to perform modular compilation
from a network of HA models to C code for PoC design.
Experimental validation of the proposed approach com-
pared with Simulink reveals that the generated code is
efficient both in terms of execution time and code size
while avoiding the semantic ambiguities associated with
Simulink. The proposed approach, thus, paves the way
for the emulation of a wide range of CPS applications in
automotive, medical devices, and robotics.
In the near future, we will compare Piha with Ze´lus and
Ptolemy quantitatively. We will also pursue the decidability
question of WHA.
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y < 110
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y(0) = 0
OFF , y′ = 0
(a) Partial hybrid automata of the water tank (top) and gas burner
(bottom), reproduced from Figure 2.
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(b) SHA of water tank (top) and gas burner(bottom)
t2 t4
ON∧OFF∧(0≤x[k]≤100)
x[k+1]=F1(δ,k,C1),k=k+1
ON∧OFF∧(x[k]=100)
x[k+1]=F2(δ,k,C1),k=k+1
OFF
C1=x[k],x[0]=x[k],k=0
initial
x[0] = 20
k = 0
b1 b4
TURN ON∧TURN OFF∧(y[k]< 110 )
y[k+1]=y[k],k=k+1
TURN ON∧TURN OFF∧(y[k]=0)
y[k+1]=y[k],k=k+1
y[k]= 110
OFF,y[0]=0,k=0
initial
y[0] = 0
k = 0
(c) Synchronous Witness Automata (SWA) of water tank and gas
burner.
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(d) Parallel composition of the SWAs of water tank and gas burner.
Fig. 8. Composition of HAs in our framework
